This paper examines insolvency (payment failure) in the top three divisions of French soccer.
Introduction
Insolvency is a systematic problem in the world of European soccer. In 2012 UEFA, the governing body of European soccer reported that 56% of clubs failed to meet at least one of the following criteria: no negative net equity, no qualification by the auditors as to whether the business was a going concern and no overdues payable (UEFA, 2012; see also Szymanski, 2015, chapter 8) . This paper examines insolvency (payment failure) at the highest levels of French soccer. Between 1970 and 2014 we observed 79 cases of insolvency arising from participation in the top two or three (since 1993) divisions, a population of 56 to 78 clubs. 1 In this paper, our objective is to explain the causes and consequences of insolvencies in French soccer. Szymanski (2012) examined data for English soccer clubs in the top four divisions (92 clubs) and found a similar incidence of insolvency (67 cases between 1982 and 2010). His results suggested that insolvency could be explained by negative productivity shocks (underperformance of the players) or negative demand shocks (revenues falling below expected levels). We also find that demand shocks can account for insolvency to a significant degree. Additionally, in the French context insolvency can be explained by club status and ownership structure, with professional status and the Association structure being more likely to trigger insolvency. We examine the post-insolvency performance of soccer clubs and find that the adverse consequences of insolvency are long lasting.
By extending the research by Szymanski (2012) from English to French soccer, we show that insolvency appears to be driven by common forces in European soccer, while noting idiosyncratic differences between countries. 4 Our paper is structured as follows. First we review the literature on insolvencies in European soccer. Section 3 explains the evolution of French insolvency law and section 4 examines the organization of professional soccer in France. Section 5 describes our data on insolvency and section 6 reports our regression results. The last section concludes.
Literature review of insolvencies in European soccer
There is now a substantial literature on the financial problems of European soccer clubs (see e.g. the Special Issue by Journal of Sports Economics introduced by Lago, Simmons and Szymanski, 2006) but, as yet, few studies on the topic of insolvencies. Buraimo, Simmons and Szymanski (2006) in their discussion of the financial problems of English clubs do not deal specifically with insolvencies but refer to them. They note that the usual reasons cited to explain why clubs amass high levels of indebtedness, including an inability to sell players as assets through the transfer market, a loss of revenues consequent on relegation, an inability to align costs and revenues following relegation, an inability to maintain loan payments on capital expenditure such as a new stadium, and a failure to realize expected revenues from TV broadcasting deals. Magraw (2008, 2010) identify five types of insolvencies in English soccer:
1. clubs that have failed to cope with relegation; 2. clubs that have failed to pay monies due to the government; 3. clubs that have seen 'soft' debt become 'hard' debt; 4. clubs that have lost the ownership of their stadium; 5. 'repeat offenders'.
As the authors indicate, these types are not mutually exclusive. Szymanski (2012) uses a unique database of financial accounts for English soccer clubs between 1973/74 and 2009/10 to examine the causes of insolvency. Two hypotheses (also not mutually exclusive) are considered. The first is "irrational exuberance", meaning that owners attempt to achieve a significant improvement in league position which is not affordable, leading to financial crisis.
The second is that club finances are subject to negative shocks -either to productivity (on the field) or to demand -and that a series of such shocks can lead to insolvency. His empirical model provides evidence in support of the negative shocks hypothesis. Barajas and Rodríguez (2010) use a logistic regression to explain why some clubs are under administration in Spanish soccer. They rely on a sample of 35 clubs in 2008, of which six were in the legal insolvency process of administration in that year. Their selected explanatory variables are mainly financial ones: financing rate (the ratio of short term debt to current assets), indebtedness (Total Debts / Total Assets), the ratio of total revenues to debt, the ratio of staff expenses to operating revenues and the ratio short-term to long-term debt. They also include divisional dummies. They find no significant impact of their explanatory variables on the likelihood that a club has entered the administration process. Barajas and Rodríguez (2014) analyze Spanish clubs during the period from 2007 until 2011, using Altman's methodology to classify clubs according to their Z-score values (Altman, 1968 (Altman, , 2000 Altman, Haldeman & Narayanan, 1977) . They note that Spanish soccer is in a very poor financial condition with most clubs being at risk of going bankrupt. The authors identify a number of steps required to restore financial stability including raising equity from the capital markets or club members, revenue enhancement, wage cuts and working to reduce current liabilities.
Insolvency laws in France
Under French law any debtor unable to meet its obligations is liable to enter a "collective insolvency proceeding" (in French "procedure collective"; Bayle, 2009) . A major landmark in the development of this process was the law 67-563 of 13 July 1967 on judicial resolution, liquidation of assets, personal bankruptcy and bankruptcies (in French, "le règlement judiciaire, la liquidation de biens, la faillite personnelle et les banqueroutes") which was intended to protect debtors from their creditors while preparing a recovery plan (Stankiewicz Murphy, 2011) .
2 Since the law of 1967, all types of private sector legal entities (even "associations") have been subject to collective insolvency proceedings (Bayle, 2009 (Bailly, 2013) . This law defined the notion of a "payment failure situation" (in French, "cessation de paiements", sometimes called "depôt de bilan" -filing for bankruptcy -in common parlance) as "the inability [of the debtor] to meet current liabilities out of disposable assets", based on a decision of the Court of Cassation (appeals court) on 14 February 1978 (Hyest, 2005 For the purposes of this paper we use the concept of "payment failure situation" (triggering a legal response) as synonymous with "insolvency". Technically speaking, a payment failure situation is triggered when current liabilities are greater than disposable assets, while insolvency is usually defined as the situation where total liabilities are greater than total assets (Tetley, 2009 ). However, since payment failure situations triggering a legal response are akin to insolvency proceedings in other countries, we feel this approach is justified.
Furthermore, we do not classify safeguard procedures as insolvencies, since they are not triggered by a payment failure situation (i.e. a formal test of assets and liabilities), but simply the judgment of the company executives that the enterprise is facing a severe financial risk.
We have compiled a list of all relevant cases in French soccer examined in this paper and the procedures followed in each case. The list is available on request from the authors.
The organization of professional soccer in France
We have data on insolvencies in French soccer clubs over the period . We now document the structural changes in the organization of the competitive hierarchy.
Our focus is primarily on professional clubs, by which we mean clubs where all or almost all players are paid employees rather than amateurs, which also tends to entail a more commercially oriented operation. and amateur clubs, with the latter permitted to pay relatively modest sums to "nonprofessional" players on the basis of a 'federal contract'. Table 1 The legal definition of soccer clubs, whether amateur or professional, has changed several times in recent decades. Until around 1990, most of the clubs were member associations, i.e. members paid a subscription to belong to the association, which was run by a committee elected by the members, there were no shareholders and any financial surplus had to be reinvested in the association. Usually these clubs were supported by local authorities through direct subsidies. Some clubs were defined as mixed economy companies ("sociétés d'économie mixte", SEM), meaning that they were controlled jointly by a members' club and a local government authority. A third organizational structure that some clubs adopted was the limited liability company with sporting object ("sociétés anonymes à objet sportif", SAOS). Until 1992, the shares of such companies had to be mainly held by the association, but after 1992, a private partner could be the main shareholder (the association minority interest was still not allowed to fall below 34%). Dividend payments were not permitted under any of these organizational structures.
In 1999 The powers of the DNCG include prohibiting the recruitment of players, auditing club payrolls and, as a last resort, imposing relegation independently of sporting performance (administrative relegation). Before the DNCG era, some insolvent clubs were subject to administrative relegation while some others were not (not relegated at all or relegated by one division on the usual grounds of sporting merit); since the start of the DNCG era all insolvent clubs have been administratively relegated as a punishment. 4 Since 1990/91, the sanctions have varied: relegation by one division (administrative relegation only), two divisions (also administrative relegation only or both administrative and sporting relegation), among others.
Since 2010/11, all insolvent clubs have been relegated by at least two divisions (administrative relegation). Gouguet and Primault (2006) argue that the DNCG has allowed French soccer to avoid the financial crisis encountered by the other major European leagues (England, Germany, Italy and Spain). Andreff (2007) , however, claims that the DNCG has not been able to effectively control the financial problems of French clubs, mainly because of the lack of transparency and disclosure. We consider the effect that the DNCG has had on declared insolvencies below. In eight cases clubs were liquidated during the season and because of this were officially ranked last, a position not necessarily representative of their sporting performance when they were insolvent. For these clubs, we chose to use league performance data from the previous season in our analysis. 5 Our date also includes seven cases where the club became insolvent at a lower level competition in the season immediately following participation in one of the top two or three divisions. Table 2 We now consider two measures of team performance -league position and match attendance -for clubs that entered insolvency, looking at the twelve year period prior to insolvency and the twelve year period after insolvency. Since we shift our focus from the top two divisions up to 1993 to the top three divisions after 1993, we show the mean performance for club insolvencies from each period separately. those with the lower numbers) until around three seasons prior to insolvency (t-3 or t-2), at which point league performance starts to deteriorate. The average improvement is about 10-13 15 league places over ten years, while the decline leading up to insolvency amounts to around 2-3 places on average over 2-3 years.
Descriptive statistics
Figures 3 and 5 show that in the three years leading up to insolvency the attendance pattern is also broadly similar for the two insolvency windows: attendance falls vey sharply, by around 40%. It is well established that lower league positions are associated with lower attendance (see e.g. Szymanski (2015, chapter 4) ), but the drop here is much larger than one might expect for the modest fall in average position. For the ten years prior to that (when league position is trending positively) the attendance picture is slightly different for the two windows. For insolvencies prior to 1993/94, average attendance is relatively stable, while for insolvencies since 1993/94 attendance is rising, by around 50% over a ten-year period. These differences may reflect more general trends in the popularity of professional soccer in France.
Post insolvency performance
From Figures 2 and 4 we can see that there is a very sharp drop in league position immediately following insolvency, by about 30 places for insolvencies prior to 1993/94 and about 40 places for insolvencies since 1993/94. This is due to the automatic and severe sporting sanctions applied by the French soccer authorities. For the earlier window average league position is roughly stable right up to t+12, while in the later window it recovers by around ten places by around t+3 and stabilizes thereafter. Overall, this suggests that average clubs struggle to recover from the penalties imposed on the clubs by the soccer authorities, even after insolvency has allowed the club to escape liability for some or all of its debts.
In the light of this, Figures 3 and 5 might seem surprising, since attendance rises significantly in both windows, reaching pre-insolvency levels by t+10, and far exceeding them by t+4.
However, some caution must be used in interpreting the data, especially for the second window where we have relatively few data points. As mentioned above, we suspect that these changes may mainly reflect changes in the popularity of French soccer in general over time.
In comparison to Szymanski (2012) the pre-insolvency patterns are rather similar, although the improvement in league position in the English case is slightly more modest (around 8 places on average from t-15 to t-6) and the fall leading up to insolvency starts earlier (from t-5) and is sharper (about 18 places). He also identifies a large fall in revenues in the years leading up to insolvency, which parallels the sharp fall in attendance observed in the French case. However, there is a very significant difference in post-insolvency performance, since
English clubs on average recovered to reach the same position they occupied in t-5 by t+5.
Insolvency in English soccer appears to be a temporary setback, in France it is a permanent one. This may well reflect the might lighter sporting penalties applied in England. While enforced relegation, often by more than one division, has long been the norm in France, there were no sporting penalties in England until 2005. Currently insolvent clubs face a points penalty (usually nine points) which makes relegation more likely, but not inevitable, and never by more than one division.
To explore this further, in Table 3 we compare the post insolvency performance of clubs with that of clubs that are relegated purely on sporting merit. 9 This table shows that insolvent clubs are far less likely to recover to their pre-insolvency league position, either within five or ten years of relegation, than clubs that were relegated on sporting merit. Table 3 shows that while 52.5% of clubs relegated on sporting merit recover to reach the division they were relegated 15 from within 5 years, and 66% do so within 10 years, only 25.5% and 36% respectively of insolvent clubs achieve the same feat. The percentage differences are even larger for clubs relegated from the second and third levels. The only exception is the relatively small number of cases from the top division, which are slightly more likely to get back to the top division within 5 years than clubs relegated on sporting merit are on average. Table 3 Since clubs may be punished for insolvency by relegation by more than one division, Table 4 reports the fraction recovering to the pre-punishment levels within 5 and 10 years. Not surprisingly, relegation by more than one division makes recovery far less likely. Table 4 6. Regression analysis
The descriptive statistics suggest that falling demand (declining attendance) is associated with insolvencies. We now develop a regression model to test whether shocks to demand can be identified as a cause of insolvency. Our regression strategy is to estimate a relationship between league performance and attendance, as a proxy for demand, and then to use the residuals from this regression as explanatory variables in a probit regression for insolvency.
Although the rise of broadcasting has made attendance less important as a source of revenue for French soccer clubs (see e.g. Andreff & Staudohar, 2000) , it remains a good proxy for overall demand since broadcasters and sponsors will pay more for rights to popular clubs (see e.g. Buraimo, Paramio & Campos, 2010) .
Following Leach (2006) we adopt an error correction framework; our performance/attendance regression model is defined as: Δrelattit = γ0 + γ1lnrelattit-1 + γ2Δlnrelattit-1 + γ3lnpit-1 + γ4Δlnpit + γ5lnrelpopit + main club dummy + promotion/relegation dummies + division/tier dummies + performance/tier interaction dummies + ηit (1) Where relatt is the average attendance of the club divided by the sum of all clubs' average attendances in that season, lnp is league rank, relpop is the population of the club urban area (referring to the French concept of "unité urbaine") divided by the sum of all urban areas with at least one club, and "main club" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the club is the main club in its urban area and 0 otherwise. Since we are using (1) to obtain best linear unbiased predictors of attendance (revenue), rather than estimates of the structural parameters, we do not need to assume the exogeneity of the right hand side variables. Table 5 presents the results of the regressions for attendance. The results are intuitive: higher attendance is associated with clubs with higher league positions, participating in higher league divisions and playing in urban areas with larger populations. Promoted clubs enjoy a significant boost to attendance while relegated teams lose support. The signs and significance levels of the coefficients are comparable to those found by Szymanski (2012) for English soccer. Table 5 The main focus of interest here is the residuals from (1). We chose to use the residuals from the fixed effects specification in Table 5 to estimate the probability of insolvency (Table 6 ).
In addition we included variables indicating (i) the interaction between club status (Professional or Amateur) and ownership form (Association or Company), (ii) divisional status (first, second or third) (iii) the presence of the DNCG or amateur control regulatory regimes. Table 6 Columns 1-6 of Table 6 differ according to the number of residuals used. Thus column 1 uses residuals in t, column 2 adds residuals in t-1, and so on until t-5. This captures the idea that insolvency can be triggered by a sequence of negative shocks. The residuals are of the right sign (negative) and significant for each regression from t to t:t-3. Note that although the coefficient is larger when only the more recent shocks are included, a longer history also means a greater cumulative effect. Overall we believe these results strongly support the findings of Szymanski (2012) that negative demand shocks contribute significantly to the probability of an insolvency event.
We also find that the coefficients for Professional * Association and Professional * Company have a positive sign and are significant in each regression, although they are much higher for Professional * Association than Professional * Company. This suggests that the Professional status is more likely to lead to insolvency than the Amateur status, but that the transformation to a more commercial structure (away from the traditional association structure) has reduced the probability of insolvency for Professional clubs. This seems plausible: amateur clubs are less likely to get into financial problems simply because they do not pay players and the wage bill is main financial risk of most clubs. Association status typically entails less concentrated ownership, and therefore less certain financial backing (given shared responsibility, there is a significant risk of free-riding).
Not surprisingly, clubs in lower divisions are more likely to enter insolvency. However, we find no evidence that the regulatory organizations, either the DNCG or the Amateur club control, have had any impact on reducing insolvency, consistent with the views of Andreff (2007). We even find a significant positive effect of DNCG (at the 10% level only) in our first regression, suggesting that the DNCG may have generated even more insolvencies 10 .
Conclusions
In this paper, our objective was to examine the causes of insolvency in French soccer over the period 1970-2014. Our dataset included all professional soccer clubs operating during this period.
We estimate the impact of demand shocks, calculated by estimating the difference between actual and expected attendance levels, based on team performance, club fixed effects and other relevant variables. Our results show that negative demand shocks significantly increase the likelihood of insolvency. The cumulative effect of these shocks can extend up to three seasons prior to the insolvency event. These findings are very similar to those of Szymanski (2012), whose data covered a similar period and who used a similar methodology for the case English professional soccer. We also find an increased probability of insolvency connected to the organizational structure of the club; professional clubs (i.e. those who employ professional rather than amateur players) and clubs organized as member associations are more likely to become insolvent.
While our results suggest that insolvency may be triggered by broadly similar causes in England and France, to some extent beyond the control of the clubs themselves, the regulatory responses differ significantly. In France the soccer authorities have long imposed a relegation penalty on insolvent clubs, often by more than one division, while in England sporting sanctions have only been applied since 2005, remain lighter, and may not even force a club to be relegated.
Our results have important policy implications. First, while the regulatory regimes in English and French soccer differ radically, the results, as least with respect to the incidence of insolvency, appear broadly similar, suggesting there are deeper systemic issues. Szymanski (2012, 2015) suggest that the systemic problem may be the promotion and relegation system, which injects a good deal of uncertainty into the competitive process.
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Second, the idea of giving fans more power through ownership is a popular one at the moment, while our results suggest that this might increase financial instability for professional clubs. Third, while insolvency is often attributed to overambitious expansion by the club management, it may be that simple bad luck plays a more important role.
Considering post insolvency events, we find that clubs frequently struggle to achieve the same level of competition again, mainly because of the difference of level between t and t+1.
This raises the question of whether penalties imposed by the French soccer authorities are justified or not. Given that the penalties can prevent a club from recovering to its previous level this is an important concern.
Footnotes 1 Soccer clubs play in leagues that are connected through the system of promotion and relegation which enables clubs to move to a higher level based on sporting merit, replacing those that perform poorly (this is in sharp contrast to the American model in which teams do not move between different levels of competition). Given this pyramid structure, there is a large number of clubs operating below this level and many of these have also become insolvent, but these cases are harder to document.
2 This procedure was limited to entities that could prove (a) the financial situation was not irreparable (b) there would be a full and speedy recovery prospects and (c) liquidation would be damaging to either the regional or the national economy. In practice the law did little to preserve insolvent businesses (Stankiewicz Murphy, 2011) .
3 Until the end of the 1980s clubs obtained about 50% of the revenues from gate receipts, 30% form sponsorship and 20% from local government subsidies. TV revenues were negligible. Since then the contribution of TV rights has risen to around 50% of the total, gate revenues has fallen to as little as 10%, and public subsidies have almost disappeared (see Andreff (2012) and LFP/DNCG (2012 ). 4 The exception is Marseille, which won the second division championship in 1994/95 and was punished by not being promoted to the first division instead. *, ** and *** mean respectively significant at the 10, 5 and 1% levels. *, ** and *** mean respectively significant at the 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
